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Abstract
This thesis attempts to explain what identity theft tax refund fraud is and how the issue
has developed over the years. It presents a holistic, historic view of the problem as well as how it
has been addressed. It primarily relies on reports from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) in its assessment. It does not examine foreign
tax administrations’ methods of dealing with identity theft refund fraud or the extent of the issue
in other principalities, and therefore this is an area in need of further research. This thesis does
not attempt to make an argument for the efficacy of funding for the IRS either, which is an area
that could be further studied. It also does not deal with employment related identity fraud, which
some relate to identity theft refund fraud.
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Background
Identity theft (IDT) tax refund fraud has become a growing issue for the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) throughout the years, as well as at a state level. The first recorded instance of this
type of fraud occurred in 1988 as the Los Angeles Times reported that Donald Penrod had been
indicted with the first ever charge of fraudulently filing tax forms electronically to receive an
illegitimate refund (Nigrini & Peters, 2018). By 1992 the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) identified the filing of fraudulent returns electronically as a major issue to be monitored
and throughout the 2000s this issue continued to increase (GAO, 1992).
This type of fraud is especially appealing to fraudsters due to their relative anonymity
which makes prosecuting the perpetrators quite difficult. It also can be conducted by either an
individual or a conglomerate. The exponential growth of the fraud occurred as in the Information
Age, people’s personally identifiable information (PII) is easier to obtain and the massive growth
in e-filing allows this fraud to be perpetrated on a large scale. E-filing has drastically increased
throughout the 21st century as in 2008 only 58% of returns were filed electronically, but this
escalated to 81% in 2012 and to over 90% in 2016 (Weisman, 2017; Brody, Haynes, & Mejia,
2014). The IRS first recognized this as a problem at large when they issued their “Dirty Dozen”
list of tax scams in 2011 when they grouped tax refund fraud in with phishing, but then escalated
their evaluation of the problem the subsequently in 2012 as that year identity theft topped the list
(McKonly & Asbury, 2011; Gudmundson, 2012). This was after IDT tax refund fraud had
already grown to a substantial level and therefore the IRS was late in their assessment of the
issue at hand, although they had taken some actions to prevent it before the Dirty Dozen was
released. This paper will attempt to explain the development of this method of fraud and how the
IRS has addressed it as well as external group’s assessments of the IRS’s actions.
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Execution
The actual execution of the fraud is relatively straightforward and comprises three main
parts that experts agree upon. It begins with a fraudster obtaining a victim’s PII such as their
name and social security number (SSN) at a bare minimum and then using this to file a
fraudulent tax return that provides them with a refund which is mailed to an address, or more
often directly deposited to a bank account or prepaid debit card. When the legitimate taxpayer
consequently files their return, it will be denied and they will be forced into undertaking a
lengthy process to right it (Thorne & Stryker, 2014; Holtfreter, McLeod, & Harrington, 2014).
This is exemplified graphically through this depiction from the GAO’s 2016 report on the issue.
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For the fraudster, obtaining the victim’s PII is the initial barrier to perpetrating IDT
refund fraud. Unfortunately, this is relatively easy in the modern era as fraudsters use a variety of
tactics to obtain such information. One rampant method is through phishing. Phishing is when a
fraudster contacts a potential victim through a medium such as telephone or email and poses as a
legitimate enterprise such as one scam where fraudsters posed as the IRS in an email. The email
will then direct the victim to a webpage that seems legitimate and thus the victim will enter in
their information for some purpose, such as it being requested for their refund to be processed or
to avoid a fee, or this link will download malware onto the victim’s computer and then probe for
their PII (Chambers & Zeidan, 2013). A recent major phishing scheme took place as fraudsters
posed as company executives emailing their payroll and human resource departments requesting
employees PII and their W-2s (GAO, 2018).
A method that has been all too common is employees stealing PII from databases through
their employment and then either using the PII to file fraudulent returns themselves or selling it
to fraudsters. There are many such businesses/institutions that have databases with vast amounts
of PII that are necessary to their operation. There have been recorded instances of employees in
prisons, educational institutions, medical facilities, and even within the IRS itself illegally
downloading vast amounts of PII from databases for the purpose of committing IDT tax refund
fraud (Nigrini & Peters, 2018).
Even the PII of deceased individuals can be used to commit this fraud. In the past this
information was incredibly readily available as it was posted in newspaper obituaries. This took
its form in the modern era as sites that provide individuals with hereditary data such as
Ancestry.com and Genealogy.com reported SSN’s of deceased individuals, although since then
many have stopped this practice due to pressure from the IRS (Fisk & Stigile, 2012).
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Another major technique employed by fraudsters is the old-fashioned technique of
obtaining/stealing physical documents/equipment with PII on it. Fraudsters may “dumpster dive”
and look through the trash of individuals looking for “discarded tax returns, bank records,
credit card receipts or other records containing personal and financial information” or even
discarded laptops that contain such info which they could use to perpetrate the fraud (Chambers
& Zeidan, 2013). They may obtain such data through home robbery where they steal documents
with PII or via pickpocketing a person’s wallet, purse, or phone. They may even steal someone’s
mail either straight from their mailbox or more diabolically submit a change of address form to
divert mail to an ulterior location (Fisk & Stigile, 2012).
Lastly a method that is becoming more and more pressing is the purchase of PII from
mass data breaches and hacking attempts (Nigrini & Peters, 2018). This enables groups to
commit substantial amounts of IDT tax refund fraud and the sum of data exposed by breaches is
increasing at an alarming rate as this graph from the Identity Theft Resource Center portrays.

Large scale data breaches are practically becoming commonplace, such as the Equifax breach in
2017 which compromised varying amounts of PII for 143 million American consumers, or 44%
of the population, further arming fraudsters of all types of IDT fraud (Marcus, 2018).
6

The actual creation of the fraudulent return is a relatively straightforward process.
Unfortunately, the IRS does not release detailed information on what schedules are used or what
kinds of numbers fraudsters use for the withholdings and credits as this would essentially create
a series of step by step instructions on how to commit the fraud. It is relatively simple to make a
return where the taxes due are less than the payments and credits, therefore generating a refund
for the fraudster (Nigrini & Peters, 2018). Nowadays the more complex aspect of the fraud is
creating a fraudulent return that is convincing enough to bypass the IRS’s filters, which will be
discussed later. The filters have gradually become more advanced throughout the years, thus
causing fraudsters to continually evolve and hone their craft, creating gradually more convincing
returns every year (IRS, 2018). The National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) notes one such new,
more sophisticated scheme where criminals use employer identification numbers (EINs) to file
business tax returns that are fraudulent (2017). This means it is necessary for the IRS to continue
to remain vigilant and anticipate these developments in the fraud so they can stop it
preemptively.
The final step in the fraud is to actually obtain the refund from the IRS. The vast majority
of fraudsters use prepaid debit cards or direct deposits, with a slight favoring for prepaid debit
cards as these can be anonymously deposited without any direct tie to the fraudster (Chambers &
Zeidan, 2013). There was a massive flaw in the tax system early in the decade where many
returns could be filed with the same address, as according to the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (TIGTA) over 2,000 returns were filed to an address in Lansing, Michigan as
well as hundreds of returns being filed to other various addresses (2012). Thankfully, this issue
as well as the issue of multiple returns being sent to an anonymous bank account have been
alleviated as of October 15, 2013 thanks to IRS actions (TIGTA, 2012). Now refunds must be
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made to a bank account or debit card in the taxpayer’s name and the number of refunds allowed
to go to a single source have been limited to three, but this has obviously not been enough to
prevent this step of the fraud altogether.
Historical Assessment
Historically, the IRS was slow in assessing IDT tax refund fraud as a major issue. As was
stated previously, the IRS did not seriously address this type of fraud with their Dirty Dozen list
of scams until 2012 at which point the amount of attempted IDT refund fraud had already
reached $20.7 billion by conservative estimates (Gudmundson, 2012). IDT tax refund fraud was
increasing exponentially prior to this as it had doubled from 2011-2012 by some estimates
(White, 2012). It should be noted that at this point the IRS was taking measures to combat this
fraud as the next section will go into, but it was around this time that their efforts were of high
priority within the organization. Throughout the years since then, identity theft has remained
high on the Dirty Dozen list as it has vacillated between the first and third spots on the list
throughout the subsequent years from 2013-2019 with it taking the 3rd spot in 2019 as the IRS
notes that despite making “major improvements” IDT refund fraud is still a constant issue and
threat to taxpayers who must remain vigilant (IRS, 2019).
Conversely, numerous other organizations realized the drastic increase in IDT refund
fraud and were already making suggestions to combat it prior to the IRS’s inclusion of it on the
Dirty Dozen with several notable organizations being the GAO, NTA and TIGTA. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) first did an audit on electronic filing fraud back in
1992 when the system was first starting to experience major problems and the amount of refund
fraud was in the millions rather than billions (Nigrini & Peters, 2018). Additionally, the NTA
featured this method of fraud as one of their most serious problems in 2005 and noted that there
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was an additional TIGTA report on identity theft that asserted the IRS had no concrete corporate
strategy in place to address the growing concern of the fraud (NTA, 2005). In this report, it is
noted that the number of complaints about tax return fraud that were sent to the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) had increased from 1.9% of their total complaints in 2002 to 3.8% of the
total complaints in 2004. While this may not seem to be a rather significant number, it shows that
the issue had escalated twofold in just three years’ time. In 2007, both the NTA and TIGTA did
an analysis of the problem and found that there had been a 396% increase in the total number of
complaints directed to the FTC, which is the only substantial indicator of the issue given that the
IRS did not begin closely monitoring it until later (Phillips, 2007; NTA, 2007). This trend
continued as a report from the GAO noted that the total number of incidents of tax-related
identity theft nearly quintupled from 2008-2010 as it grew from 51,702 to 248,357 cases (White,
2011) Overall, since 2005 the problem continued to worsen as shown by the fact that it has been
consistently listed as one of the NTA’s most serious problems (aside from 2006, 2010 and 2014
oddly), leading to increased IRS action regarding the phenomena throughout the last decade.
IRS Actions
While the IRS may have been late to address IDT tax refund fraud, it has undertaken
substantial measures to combat the problem. Many of these solutions have come in part from
recommendations from the GAO, TIGTA, and NTA as their annual reports on the issue routinely
offer assistance. As the previous section suggests, the IRS has been slow to act and a 2012 NTA
report shows just this. Within this report is a table that outlines various recommendations that the
NTA had made within its annual congressional reports and their implementation years. While it
is only a small sample size of eight recommendations from a single organization, it took the IRS
an average of 4.38 years to implement the policy recommendation which is a shockingly long
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amount of time even for a government entity (NTA, 2012). The NTA has critiqued the IRS
overall as taking a reactive stance to IDT tax refund fraud as they have continuously advocated
for a more proactive approach (NTA, 2007). It should also be noted that overall the IRS has
sought to prevent individuals from being able to commit refund fraud rather than prosecute
specific people as they have assessed this as being the more affective approach (Nigrini & Peters,
2018). Despite this, the Criminal Investigation branch of the IRS did manage to convict
approximately 2,000 identity thieves from the years of 2013-2015 (“IRS States and Tax,” 2016).
Over the years the IRS has developed their techniques, administrative bodies, and
systems for dealing with IDT tax refund fraud. In 2005 they officially established the Identity
Theft Program Office, later creating the Privacy, Information Protection, and Data Security and
the Identity Theft and Incident Management office with an accompanying Advisory Committee
in 2007 (NTA, 2007). In 2008, they began marking taxpayers accounts within the IRS database if
they had been victims of this fraud, therefore helping to coordinate their efforts to help taxpayers
across various divisions. They also established the Identity Protection Specialized Unit to help
taxpayers who had been victims as well as a toll-free hotline for victims to get a better
understanding of the process that they would need to complete (NTA, 2008).
In 2009 the IRS began implementing a series of filters or “business rules” that could
automatically assess if a return seemed fraudulent and flag it for screening by an actual IRS
employee. They also created the Identity Theft Affidavit, IRS form 14039 (which is still used to
this day) in April 2009 so that taxpayers who knew they were victims of IDT tax refund fraud
could notify the IRS of the issue, thereby streamlining the process somewhat for identity
confirmation. Lastly, in this year they started their educational campaign against falling victim to
identity theft. By educating taxpayers and practitioners on methods to prevent falling prey to

10

identity theft, the IRS could effectively diminish the tax related identity theft fraud and therefore
was involved in over 40 events throughout the year, six of those being Nationwide Tax Forums
(NTA, 2009).
From 2010-2011 the IRS began increasing their efforts against IDT tax refund fraud. In
2010 they implemented the Electronic Fraud Detection System, which is still in place to some
extent to this day. This was a more developed form of the filters that they had used previously as
it would analyze returns both based on a series of general filters and based on past years returns.
From there it could “score” the returns and determine a probability of them being fraudulent,
with those scoring above a certain percentage being subject to further screening and extremely
high scores being treated as fraudulent automatically (TIGTA, 2010). In 2011 they created the
Enhanced Return Processing program which sought to coordinate efforts throughout the IRS’
various divisions as an NTA report found that 28 different subunits were involved in activities
regarding identity theft (NTA, 2011). From this came a program that sought to quell the number
of fraudulent returns being filed with deceased individuals’ information. They accomplished this
to some extent by working with the Social Security Administration (SSA) to begin marking the
IRS accounts of deceased individuals and putting pressure on sites such as Ancestry.com to stop
listing the PII of decedents (Fisk & Stigile, 2012).
As 2012 was the first year that the IRS listed IDT tax refund fraud on its Dirty Dozen tax
scams, it is unsurprising that this year a number of improvements were made in the fight against
fraudsters. This is due to the fact that the IRS assigned ample resources in this year as around
3,000 employees were dedicated to the issue and over $300 million was spent on it (Nigrini &
Peters, 2018). One of the most substantial programs that the IRS further developed this year was
the Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN) program which began being
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created in 2010 (NTA, 2012). This involves a taxpayer being assigned a specific IP PIN that they
must use in order to file their return electronically, the medium that the fraud takes place in a for
the most part. The only taxpayers who are outright assigned an IP PIN are those who have been
victims of IDT tax refund fraud in the past, but additionally it was offered to taxpayers in
Florida, Georgia, and the District of Columbia to opt into as these were the areas that the IRS
assessed have the highest fraud rate per capita (Hammel & Murolo, 2016). In total, 251,500 IP
PIN’s were issued in 2012 and 12,936 taxpayers filed using an incorrect PIN, but this was later
established to largely be due to human error when entering the PIN and not a problem with the
system (White, 2012). The NTA report does note one issue with the program in that the IP PINs
are all issued in one batch annually instead of issuing a PIN with every individual case that is
brought to them throughout the year (NTA, 2012). Moreover, the IRS continued in its efforts to
educate taxpayers through a digital approach. They created www.IRS.gov/identitytheft on which
they regularly post the most up to date info on IDT tax refund fraud and also created a series of
YouTube videos and podcasts titled ID Theft: Protect Yourself from Identity Theft and ID Theft:
Are You a Victim of Identity Theft? in an attempt to reach a younger demographic (Fisk &
Stigile, 2012). In 2012 they also decentralized their efforts to increase specialization and “utilize
the unique skill sets and experience of dedicated employees” by creating 21 specialized subunits
to address the issue, but unfortunately this approach did not see much success (NTA, 2012).
Additionally, a formal department was created to analyze the returns identified by the
filters known as the Taxpayer Protection Program (TPP) which would also work with legitimate
taxpayers who were falsely screened (TIGTA, 2018). Lastly, they created the Refund Fraud and
Identity Theft Global Report, commonly referred to as simply the “Global Report.” This sought
to consolidate and condense information about IDT tax refund fraud from various IRS divisions,
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and even other governmental bodies into one, standalone report. This would be used to further
coordinate the IRS’s efforts and serve as a management tool for responding to the issue. This
was significant as previously subunits could be very compartmentalized and therefore this was
seen as an excellent opportunity to create a more consistent strategic view (White, 2012).
Through 2013 and 2014 progress was not as rapid. As was stated earlier, the IRS
implemented a ruling that limited the number of refund deposits made to a single bank account
or prepaid debit card to three (Nigrini & Peters, 2018). In this same vein they also mandated that
the account be in the filers name in an attempt to interfere with the second step of the fraudsters
in acquiring the refund (TIGTA, 2012). A minor improvement was made to the IP PIN program
in 2014 as previously taxpayers could only receive IP PINs and replacement PINs through the
mail, but this year an online portal was created for PIN holders to retrieve their PIN (NTA,
2013). Congress also showed an interest in abating the fraud as they passed the Stop Identity
Theft Act of 2014 (Thorne & Stryker, 2014). This increased penalties for committing the crime
and also mandated the Department of Justice to collaborate with the IRS on future efforts and to
provide an annual report to Congress with updates. To help with the analysis of the issue, the
Identity Theft Taxonomy, or simply the Taxonomy was created to actually track and determine
the amount of IDT tax refund fraud that was attempted and the amount of refunds actually issued
to false filers, as previously the IRS was relying mostly on estimates (GAO, 2014).
In 2015 the IRS recommitted itself to preventing IDT tax refund fraud as it committed
over 4,000 full-time employees or equivalents and spent approximately $470 million, but it noted
that even more funding would prove useful (GAO, 2016). A major part of these efforts was
revamping the Electronic Fraud Detection System (EFDS) as they began testing the new Return
Review Process (RRP) which had been in development since 2009 (GAO, 2015). While the two
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systems were running congruently, the system was known as the Dependent Database due to the
fact that it would take time for the RRP to handle the full load of returns. The major benefit of
the RRP is that in addition to the filters that were used in previous systems that relied on binary
analysis, the RRP’s filters consisted of both rules and models. Additionally, the system is much
more flexible and fluid as it is much easier to make amendments to than the EFDS. Its efficacy
was seen in the first year as its false detection rate (FDR), or in other words the percent of
legitimate returns it flagged as fraudulent was only 37.9% in comparison to the EFDS’ FDR of
54.5% (NTA, 2016). This year the IRS also consolidated their IDT victim assistance functions
into the Wage and Investment division, doing away with the 21 specialized units that was
established in 2012 in response to the Tax Refund Prevention Act of 2014, which was proposed
by Senator Hatch from Utah, a longtime proponent of prevention (NTA, 2014). A major benefit
of this would be that a victim of the fraud would now have all their communications with the IRS
be through a single point of contact, instead of having to deal with numerous employees across
different departments. There would still be some cases that would require special attention, but
the majority of standard cases would now be streamlined, which the NTA advocated for in many
prior years (2016). It was also reported that in this year they had increased the number of
taxpayer accounts that had been marked as deceased to around 28.4 million (TIGTA, 2015).
The undertaking from this year that will likely have the most profound effect going
forward was the creation of the Security Summit, which was a meeting between “IRS officials,
the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the leading tax preparation firms, software developers,
payroll and tax financial product processors, and state tax administrators” to discuss ways they
could collectively address IDT tax refund fraud (IRS, 2015). From this a public-private
partnership was formed consisting of three working groups, these being based around
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authentication methods, information sharing techniques, and a Strategic Threat Assessment and
Response (STAR) working group that was designed to anticipate future issues. Out of these
working groups came various ideas and initiatives such as improving the data elements in the
filters and furthering external identity proofing procedures. They also worked on developing the
External Leads Program for “financial institutions, software companies, prepaid card companies
and other third parties” to share information with the IRS about developing trends in identity
theft (IRS, 2015). Finally, they discussed creating the framework for the Tax Ecosystem Refund
Fraud Information Sharing & Assessment Center (ISAC) and NIST Cybersecurity Framework
(first proposed in 2014) to further contest fraudsters (IRS, 2015).
In 2016 some of the work of the Security Summit came to fruition as it further split into
seven work groups. The Communication and Taxpayer Awareness Work Group launched several
programs aimed at educating taxpayers and tax preparers such as “Taxes. Security. Together.”,
“Protect Your Clients; Protect Yourself” and the “National Tax Security Awareness Week”
gaining nationwide media coverage (“Despite Major Progress,” 2018). The Authentication Work
Group collaborated with tax software providers to create uniform, more secure standards for
password creation and security questions and the Information Sharing Work Group worked with
these software providers to share confidential data elements from tax returns with the IRS. The
Authentication Work Group also introduced a pilot program to add a 16-digit verification code to
2 million Forms W-2, Wage and Tax Statements in order to confirm that the submitted W-2s
were real, accurate forms (Murolo, 2016). This would help prevent fraudsters from being able to
concoct fictitious W-2s as it would create this additional verification step, thus forcing the
fraudsters to either steal accurate W-2s to acquire the code, therein making the fraud more
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complicated. The IRS planned on furthering the program to be included on 50 million W-2s in
2017 with hopes of eventually making it a national, all-inclusive program.
In 2017 another massive advancement was made regarding W-2s in the effort against
IDT tax refund fraud, this being the accelerating of the W-2 deadline submission for employers.
Although this had been suggested as early as 2011 and had been reiterated by numerous
organizations for several years, it took so long because it required being passed by Congress to
be implemented (White, 2011). As this graphic shows, previously W-2s were not due to the SSA

until February 29th in paper form and April 2nd electronically, quite late into the filing season
(GAO, 14). There was an additional delay between when the SSA received the forms and when
they would be sent to the IRS. This has been a problem due to the fact that it meant the IRS
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could not match W-2 information to tax returns in real time, as shown by the fact that they had
already issued nearly 60% of all refunds before they received a single W-2. This issue is further
worsened by the fact that fraudsters would usually file very early in the tax season in an attempt
to file before the legitimate taxpayer. However, in 2016 the passing of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act moved the deadline for filing W-2s up to January 31st (although there would
be some delay in them being transferred from the SSA to the IRS) for the 2017 tax season so that
the IRS could match tax return information to W-2 information in real time (GAO, 2016). It has
been noted that this may cause an increase in the correction rate of W-2s by employers causing
them to have to resubmit them, but there is little research done on this currently. Additionally,
there has not been any research into whether or not this has increased costs for private
companies, but it should not be substantial as January 31st was previously the deadline that
employers had to provide W-2s to their employees. Moving the deadline forward has proven to
be effective as there was a 30% increase in received W-2 forms by March of 2017 (“Objectives
Report,” 2017).
There were numerous other measures in 2017 that were realized as well, notably the
creation of the Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC). The idea of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers was created in 1988 with
Presidential Decision Directive 63 and have been used in “energy, financial services, and surface
transportation to facilitate coordination between public and private entities” (GAO, 2017). Its
purpose is to allow the IRS, states, and industry partners to quickly and efficiently share
information about developments in IDT tax refund fraud through an online platform and the
creation of a collaborative organization (GAO, 2017). When it was created, a total of 31 states,
14 tax preparation companies, and 3 financial institutions partnered with the IRS and the online
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platform was launched on January 23rd, 2017. Since its inception, the partnership has grown
drastically as currently around 60 private entities have engaged in ISAC and every state has
joined to some extent (ISAC, 2018). Through the online portal, various entities may submit lead
reports, more commonly referred to simply as “leads” of cyber threats for the IRS to analyze. In
just the first year of its inception, the IRS received over 1.8 million leads, but there was some
amount of trepidation from industry representatives who were unsure about the usefulness of
their leads due to a lack of communication from the IRS. The necessary feedback on the leads is
hampered by a lack of resources at the IRS and by IRS section 6103 which limits the IRS’s
ability to share taxpayer or record-level data due to confidentiality concerns, and the amount of
information that can be shared with financial institutions is even further limited (GAO, 2017).
This as well as further broadening the amount of users of the online portal may continue to
facilitate the usefulness of ISAC and increase its efficacy in years to come (ISAC, 2018).
Lastly 2017 saw the deployment of the IRS’s Rapid Response Team (RRT), which was
created in 2016 to respond to events that created a significant amount of threat to IDT refund
fraud within 24-72 hours. It would assess the situation and attempt to provide as much damage
control as possible, and then around 2-3 days after the instance, it would provide action steps for
future prevention and methods for alleviation of the threat. It was deployed in March 2017 in
response to a threat created by the hacking of the IRS’s Data Retrieval Tool which is a part of
FAFSA.gov, a website for individuals to enter financial information to acquire need based
financial aid from the government. It was estimated that around 100,000 individuals had their PII
stolen in this manner and shows how fraudsters are employing increasingly clever techniques to
steal even more detailed PII from potential victims. Thanks to the RRT’s actions, the IRS was
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able to prevent the issuance of over 8,000 fraudulent returns and has implemented new security
measures associated with the Data Retrieval Tool (GAO, 2017).
Effectiveness of Actions
It is clear that the IRS has taken many steps to combat the issue, but the question of
where or not these actions have had an impact on the amount of fraud and the rate at which the
IRS is unable to identify it is an important metric. Unfortunately, this is a very difficult question
to answer. This can be shown by the discrepancy between amounts of refund fraud reported by
TIGTA and amounts of refund fraud reported by the GAO. This graph shows the reported
amount of attempted refund fraud by the two organizations, as well as the amount of fraudulent
refunds that were actually obtained by fraudsters according to the GAO. It is obviously apparent
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that the GAO reports a much higher level of attempted fraud and thus also estimates a more
significant amount of refunds issued to fraudsters. This is due to the fact that the GAO reports
that the “IRS does not know the full extent of the occurrence of identity theft” (White, 2012).
This is because if a fraudulent return passes by the IRS’s preventative measures and is issued
undetected, the IRS is unaware that this occurred if the legitimate taxpayer does not file a return
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in that year. Even if they do manage to catch the fact that a fraudulent return has been issued, the
IRS has had difficulty in the past aggregating this data to get an idea of the full extent of the
issue (White, 2012). With this the GAO has also noted issues with the IRS’s estimates. The
Global Report, which the IRS uses to a high degree to analyze the amount of IDT tax refund
fraud does not account for returns that pass underneath a certain threshold. Additionally, it has
been shown to malfunction and count fraudulent returns that were caught as multiple instances as
it counts each system that catches a fraudulent return, so if both the EFDS and the RRP catch a
return, the Global Report double counts it. This leads to the GAO’s recommendation of using
return-level data to estimate the amount of fraud in both the Global Report and the Taxonomy as
using primary data would provide Congress and other decision makers with more accurate
information (2016). Overall it is heartening that the range between which the IRS is reporting the
extent of fraud has decreased over the years, as shown by the convergence between the amounts
reported by TIGTA and the GAO. This implies that the estimates that are being used are
becoming more accurate as time goes on and the IRS has gotten a much better sense of the
degree of the problem since first listing it on the Dirty Dozen in 2012.
Even more encouraging is that it appears the amount of fraud perpetrated and the rate of
successful fraud are on the decline. The NTA furthermore presents this from 2015-2017 based on
the total number of cases of IDT
tax refund fraud (2017). Despite
the fact that the precise amount of
fraud is incredibly difficult to
estimate, as a whole the IRS has
shown to be making strides
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towards abating the problem. From 2015 there has been a 65% drop in instances of IDT tax
refund fraud and from 2016 a 36% decline has been observed (NTA, 2017). While the IRS
certainly has not eliminated the fraud in its entirety, its actions have been shown to be effective.
It is practically impossible to point to a single tactic employed by the IRS to be most effective,
but the NTA points to the improvement of the filters and systems the IRS uses, notably the
implementation of the RRP, and the fact that the W-2 deadline was moved up as the primary
drivers of the decrease in IDT tax refund fraud (NTA, 2017).
Has the IRS Gone too Far?
While the effectiveness of the IRS’s actions are commendable, it has been asserted that
the IRS has placed an undue, overreaching burden on the everyday taxpayer through their efforts.
The GAO notes that the IRS is put in a difficult situation where they need to “prevent fraudsters
from passing authentication using stolen taxpayer information, but it must balance that against
the burden on legitimate taxpayers who must also authenticate” (GAO, 2018). A champion of
this cause is the NTA who have been critical of the IRS for surpassing their bounds in their effort
to prevent IDT tax refund fraud. Notably one way that the IRS has overburdened taxpayers was
in the false detection
rate (FDR) of the
Taxpayer Protection
Program’s filters
(“Objectives Report,”
2018). This is the rate
at which legitimate tax returns are flagged as fraudulent, therefore forcing the taxpayer to verify
their identity with the IRS. As the graph shows, there has been a marked increase in the FDR of
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the filters over the years, even though the number of cases of IDT tax refund fraud has fallen
over the years. In 2017, 1.9 million taxpayers were forced to verify their identities with 1.17
million completing the verification (GAO, 2018). In 2016 over $9 billion in legitimate refunds
were delayed for an average of approximately 36 days (NTA, 2016). While this delay may not
seem significant, it may impose significant hardship on low-income taxpayers who rely on their
refunds. Low-income taxpayers often rely on their refund, of which the average was around
$2,800 in 2016 to pay for various things such as heating bills, rent, groceries or for general
quality of life and thus this delay can have a major impact in their lives (GAO, 2014; NTA,
2016).
One would expect the filters to have become more advanced and have a lower FDR over
time as the number of filters has increased steadily over the years. TIGTA has reported that in
2014 only 114 filters were in place, but this number jumped to 196 in 2015 and has stayed
around this level since then as 183 filters were in place in 2016, 197 in 2017 and most recently
200 in 2018. In the private sector, typically an FDR of 50% is considered acceptable, but is still
obviously not optimal (NTA, 2018). The high FDR rate has both a monetary cost to the IRS as
IRS employees must deal with the authentications of these legitimate taxpayers, but it also has
the side effect of decreased employee morale. Studies have shown that when FPRs start to
exceed 25:1, employees become more careless as they assume their actions will not actually
uncover fraud, therein decreasing employee engagement (NTA, 2016).
The process by which the taxpayer must authenticate their identity has also been shown
to be overly burdensome for the victim. High risk taxpayers must verify their identity at a
Taxpayer Assistance Center (TAC), of which there are around 400, by providing a government
issued ID (GAO, 2018). In some cases, the closest TAC may be hundreds of miles away, or the
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closest one may not have available appointments for over a month, so if the taxpayer is of lower
income and may not have steady access to transportation or be working multiple jobs, this is a
daunting task that imposes substantial harm (“Objectives Report,” 2017). Low risk taxpayers can
verify their identity over the phone, and while this may not seem overly burdensome, in many
instances it is. For the 2016 filing season, the TPP phone line received around 4.4 million calls,
but it had a level of service (LOS), which is the percent of phone calls that are answered versus
the taxpayer hanging up before a representative can see to them, of only 22.7% on average which
was the worst performance for any high-volume line operated by the IRS (“Objectives Report,”
2016). This graphic from the 2015 fiscal year sheds some light on why the LOS has fallen so low

for this particular phone line (NTA, 2015). As shown by the week of February 7th, there were
times taxpayers were forced to wait as long as an hour before they were processed through to an
assistant, and this was when only around 35% of all calls were being sent to a representative. The
IRS simply does not have sufficient resources devoted to the phone line for it to be an effective
method of authentication and can be incredibly frustrating for a taxpayer to deal with. Victims
are forced through this process of authentication at a time in their lives when they are under the
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most stress as they must deal with their identity being stolen. In addition to having to deal with
the issue of their identity being stolen and used for tax refund fraud, they most likely will also
have to deal with it being misused for a variety of other types of fraud and it can be quite
difficult for one to regain their identity in its entirety once it has been compromised. Psychiatrists
have stated that the symptoms of identity theft victims are similar to those of people suffering
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD, and thus it is cruel to put them through such a
burdensome authentication process during such a vulnerable time (NTA, 2013).
Future Measures
With that in consideration, what can the IRS do moving forward to both combat IDT tax
refund fraud while still adhering to taxpayer’s needs? It certainly needs to improve its
authentication services but opening more TACs or increasing its phone line staffing would both
be costly options. The most cost-effective method of authentication for the IRS is currently its
online methods, but these can only be used for very low risk cases where they must answer
questions based on prior years tax returns, or for high-risk individuals who have set up multifactor authentication with an IRS database. This can authenticate the taxpayer through methods
such as sending a code to a mobile phone, thus ensuring the taxpayer possesses the phone, but if
it has not been set up beforehand the taxpayer cannot use this method as a fraudster could simply
set up the system with their own phone number, therefore making it worthless (GAO, 2018). If
the IRS were to set up this sort of system with every taxpayer, then it could much more
effectively, and more cheaply verify the identities of victims without making them jump through
hoops and work through layers of red tape to do so.
The IRS could also work to improve their filters and systems to decrease the FDR and
therefore the number of individuals who need to go through authentication. One possible way to
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go about this would be to create a filter system that implements machine learning that relies on
models instead of simple binary rules (“Objectives Report,” 2018). It could also simply use
predicative models to more accurately determine the number of filters necessary and adjust the
filters more regularly, as in 2016 one filter had an FDR of around 91% and thus should have
been discarded before the end of the filing season if they had kept up to date analytics with a
fluid system (NTA, 2016). Overall, they should partner with “experts in the financial industry,
including the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council” who have experience and a
proven track record creating such systems, and with the increased collaboration offered by ISAC,
this seems like the perfect opportunity to do so (NTA, 2016). In a hearing before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on April 17th, 2018 the IRS commissioner
agreed to try to bring the FDR down to at least 50% (“Objectives Report,” 2018). The exact
methods to be employed are not known as of this date, or whether there are plans to attempt to
further decrease the FDR subsequently, but it is certainly a step in the right direction.
The IRS could also seek to further prevent IDT tax refund fraud outright by expanding
the IP PIN program into a national program. The number of PINs issued has steadily grown,
going from around 250,000 in 2012 to roughly 3.5 million in 2017, but this has still only been for
past victims of IDT refund fraud and residents of Florida, Georgia, and the District of Columbia
who opt-in to it (Thorne & Stryker, 2014; GAO, 2018). By requiring every taxpayer to file with
an IP PIN, the IRS could see impressive results as an estimated $193 of revenue was protected
for every taxpayer who received an IP PIN in 2014. This is with a cost of issuing IP PINs being
only around $36 for a three-year period, so therefore every dollar spent on the program has a
return of something in the range of $5.36 (NTA, 2015). The question for where this funding
would come from may already be answered. Currently if a company such as Equifax is to blame
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for a massive data-breach, it will offer victims credit monitoring services, so the IRS could
therefore attempt to put this financial burden off to the private sector to some extent, especially
as the rate of large-scale data breaches is growing. The only issue with this program is that the IP
PIN would therefore become another piece of PII that fraudsters could steal, although it would at
least make the fraud more difficult. This has actually already occurred as in March of 2016
hackers were able to obtain over 100,000 IP PINs by exploiting the IP PIN retrieval tool, and
thus this system is not without its faults (GAO, 2017).
The most effective, but also most controversial tactic of combating IDT tax refund fraud
would be to delay the tax filing season or refund issuances. This would allow the IRS to fully
match return data with the W-2s and give taxpayers more time to respond if their identity had
been stolen. Unfortunately, as was aforementioned this would likely have a disastrous impact on
low income taxpayers who rely on their tax refunds to survive. In total it would have a negative
impact on a significant number of taxpayers as about 70% of taxpayers are issued a refund every
year, thus making it a very undesirable motion to put forward in Congress. In the 2016 IRS
Nationwide Tax Forum, various CPAs were polled about the legitimacy of pushing back the
refund date, and consistently participants warned against it as it would be “difficult” to change
taxpayer’s expectations about when they would receive their refund (NTA, 2016). It is incredibly
unlikely that the IRS would undertake this course of action due to how wildly unpopular it would
be, but if the problem reversed its course, it may become necessary at a future date.
Individual Prevention
With all this in mind, it would be expected that one would wonder what they can do to
ensure that they are not victims of IDT tax refund fraud themselves. There are numerous ways
that one can go about this, all with varying levels of effectiveness.
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The most obvious tactic that one can employ is to send in their tax return early in the
filing season. If an individual files their return before fraudsters have the opportunity to, then
they can eliminate the chance that they are victims of the fraud (Chambers & Zeidan, 2013). This
is by far the most effective method, but also given the human nature to procrastinate, may be one
of the most difficult for some people.
Another very important lesson for one to take away is to protect one’s PII, which can take
many forms. It is crucially important to understand how phishing attempts work and how one can
avoid them. It can take many forms from a call saying someone won a sweepstakes, to an email
that seemingly looks like it is from the IRS demanding action to avoid a fine, to even more
advanced methods of emails that are “spoofed” to look like they come from an employee at a
place of work. In general, it is good to just be aware that fraudsters are taking such efforts to
steal your PII, but one can also view www.IRS.gov/identitytheft where the IRS regularly posts
about new forms of phishing and what to be on the lookout for (Fisk & Stigile, 2012).
It is also important to protect physical forms of PII. It is important to secure physical
copies of documents containing PII in one’s home in a locked cabinet or safe, to never carry
around such documents if it can be avoided, and to shred documents with such information when
they are no longer needed as some fraudsters will go dumpster diving looking for such forms
(Chambers & Zeidan, 2013). One should also protect their mail by avoiding using unsecured
mailboxes and by putting a hold on their mail if going on vacation/a work trip and will be unable
to pick up their mail (Fisk & Stigile, 2012). It is important to protect one’s information when
going online as well. This can be accomplished by keeping anti-virus software up to date, setting
up a firewall on home networks, and in general by making sure websites that one goes on are
secure by checking for a lock next to the URL or an https:// (Brody, Haynes, & Mejia, 2014). To
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protect one’s electronic information, make sure before being thrown away or sold, computers or
phones are wiped of all data to make sure it does not end up in the wrong hands. It is also
important to use strong, unique passwords as a rule of thumb. Moreover, one should regularly
look at their credit report and bank statements to check for suspicious activity and ensure that
they are not already a victim of identity theft (Fisk & Stigile, 2012). Finally, external parties can
also be employed to protect/monitor one’s identity such as Lifelock and IdentityForce (Kluwer,
2015).
If one is still concerned that they may fall prey to IDT tax refund fraud, they may employ
additional measures to give themselves a sense of security. Often when one has their taxes done
by an external party such as a CPA or a firm such as H&R Block, this other entity will deal with
going through the authentication process should one’s identity be stolen. Some may charge an
additional fee if this is the case or have an “insurance” that can be purchased separately, and
while this will not prevent the fraud from occurring, it will make it so that the taxpayer does not
have to deal with the fallout from it themselves. One can also file IRS form 8821. This makes it
so that if a return is filed in the taxpayer’s name, they will receive a notification about it. Again,
this is not a prevention method, but if one contacts the IRS before they issue a refund to the
phony return, one can vastly accelerate receiving their own refund while simultaneously
preventing a fraudulent one (Thorne & Stryker, 2014).
Conclusion
IDT tax refund fraud is so appealing to potential fraudsters due to the relative “safety”
they have with the anonymity and the relatively low amount of PII needed to commit it. While
the IRS has contributed significant resources to the issue since 2012, this was practically at the
peak of the problem as they did not heed the warnings of other groups and address the problem
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prematurely. Generally with their actions the IRS has still been far behind what external groups
are recommending as they will often implement what has been recommended several years after
the recommendation has been made, such as assigning a single representative to handle each case
of refund fraud, as recommended by the NTA. IDT tax refund fraud will be a constant threat and
area to watch moving forwards as fraudsters will not simply let the IRS “win” and will instead
constantly become more advanced and evolve their techniques to circumvent the IRS’s filters.
The full extent of the problem is not even known, and while it seems that the IRS has been
successful in abating it, this may be due to underestimates to ensure they appear effective in their
Congressional reports. It is also concerning how far the IRS has gone in some areas as they have
made the processes overly burdensome on taxpayers, but thankfully it does seem like actions are
being taken in the right direction to alleviate this load. The problem of IDT tax refund fraud will
not simply go away overnight and the IRS will likely be dealing with it in one form or another
for decades to come, and should thus be closely monitored and it should be ensured that the IRS
is held accountable for their efforts.

29

References
2005 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2005, December 31). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from
NTA website: https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/section_1.pdf
2007 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2007, December 31). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from
NTA website: https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc_2007_vol_1_cover_msps.pdf
2008 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2008, December 31). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from
NTA website: 2https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_intro_toc_msp.pdf
2009 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2008, December 31). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from
NTA website: https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/1_09_tas_arc_vol_1_preface_toc_msp.pdf
2011 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2011, December 31). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from
NTA website: https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_1.pdf
2012 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2012, December 31). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from
NTA website: http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/MostSerious-Problems-Identity-Theft.pdf
2013 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2013, December 31). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from
NTA website: http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-AnnualReport/downloads/Identity-Theft-The-IRS-Should-Adopt-a-New-Approach-to-IdentityTheft.pdf
2014 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2014, December 31). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from
NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-AnnualReport/Volume-One.pdf
2015 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2015, December 31). Retrieved May 6, 2019, from
NTA website: Objectives Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2017 (Rep.). (2016, June 30).

30

Retrieved May 6, 2019, from NTA website:
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-JRC/Volume_1.pdf
2015 Security Summit Protecting Taxpayers from Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud (Rep.).
(2015). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from IRS website: https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/2015
Security Summit Report.pdf
2016 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2016, December 31). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from
NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2016ARC/ARC16_Volume1.pdf
2017 Annual Report to Congress (Rep.). (2017, December 31). Retrieved May 7, 2019, from
NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017ARC/ARC17_Volume1_MSP_19_IDTheft.pdf
Additional Actions Could Help IRS Combat the Large, Evolving Threat of Refund Fraud (Rep.).
(2014, August). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665368.pdf
As Tax-Related Identity Theft Schemes Evolve, the IRS Must Continually Assess and Modify Its
Victim Assistance Procedures (Rep.). (2017, December 31). Retrieved May 6, 2019, from
NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017ARC/ARC17_Volume1_MSP_19_IDTheft.pdf
Asbury, &. McKonly (2011, May 4). The Dirty Dozen Tax Scams of 2011. Retrieved from
https://www.macpas.com/the-dirty-dozen-tax-scams-of-2011/
Brody, R. G., Haynes, C. M., & Mejia, H. (2014). Income Tax Return Scams and Identity
Theft. Accounting and Finance Research,3(1). doi:10.5430/afr.v3n1p90

31

Chambers, V., & Zeidan, R. (2013). Stopping Tax Identity Theft: Practical Advice for CPAs and
Clients. Journal of Accountancy, 60-64.
Despite Major Progress, Identity Theft Still on IRS ‘Dirty Dozen’ Tax Scams List [Press release].
IRS, Security Summit. (2018, March 7). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/despite-major-progress-identity-theft-still-on-irs-dirty-dozentax-scams-list
Enhanced Authentication Could Combat Refund Fraud, but IRS Lacks an Estimate of Costs,
Benefits and Risks (Rep.). (2015, January). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667965.pdf
Fisk, S. M., & Stigile, C. (2012). Will the Real John Doe Please Stand Up?: Tax Identity Theft
Developments. Journal of Tax Practice & Procedure, 21-71.
GAO. 1992. Tax administration: IRS can improve controls over Electronic Filing Fraud
(GAO/GGD-93-27). Washington, DC: GAO.
Gudmundson, E. (2012, February 16). IRS Releases the Dirty Dozen Tax Scams for 2012.
Retrieved April 24, 2019, from https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/IRS-Releasesthe-Dirty-Dozen-Tax-Scams-for-2012.aspx
Hammel, S. W., & Murolo, S. B. (2016). IP PINs: Fraud protection places duties on
preparers. Tax Practice Corner, 64-65.
Holtfreter, R., McLeod, T., & Harrington, A. (2014, March/April). Identity theft tax refund
fraud. Retrieved from https://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294982014
Improved Collaboration Could Increase Success of IRS Initiatives to Prevent Refund
Fraud (Rep.). (2017, November). Retrieved May 6, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688612.pdf

32

Interim Results of the 2010 Filing Season (Rep.). (2010, March 31). Retrieved May 1, 2019,
from TIGTA website:
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2010reports/201041047fr.pdf
IRS. (2019, March 20). IRS concludes "Dirty Dozen" list of tax scams for 2019: Agency
encourages taxpayers to remain vigilant year-round [Press release]. Retrieved April 25,
2019, from https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-concludes-dirty-dozen-list-of-tax-scams-for2019-agency-encourages-taxpayers-to-remain-vigilant-year-round
IRS Needs to Strengthen Taxpayer Authentication Efforts (Rep. No. 18-418). (2018, June).
Retrieved April 25, 2019, from GAO website: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/692712.pdf
IRS Needs to Update Its Risk Assessment for the Taxpayer Protection Program (Rep.). (2016,
May). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677406.pdf
IRS, States and Tax Industry Combat Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts. (2016,
January 1). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-states-and-taxindustry-combat-identity-theft-and-refund-fraud-on-many-fronts
ISAC Annual Report (Rep.). (2018, April). Retrieved May 6, 2019, from ISAC website:
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/IDTTRF ISAC April 2018 Annual Report.pdf
IRS, Security Summit. (2018, February 8). Key IRS Identity Theft Indicators Continue Dramatic
Decline in 2017; Security Summit Marks 2017 Progress Against Identity Theft [Press
release]. Retrieved April 25, 2019, from https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/key-irs-identitytheft-indicators-continue-dramatic-decline-in-2017-security-summit-marks-2017-progressagainst-identity-theft

33

Kluwer, W. (2015). Tax Briefing: Identity Theft Update; As Identity Theft Grows, IRS and
Practitioners React. Journal of Tax Practice & Procedure, 29-32.
Marcus, D. J. (2018). The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive Solutions for Protecting Consumers’
Personal Information. Duke Law Journal, 68 (555), 556-593.
Murolo, S. B. (2016). Security Summit touts improvements in its first year. Journal of
Accountancy,78-78.
Nigrini, M. J., & Peters, J. S. (2018). Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud: An Analysis of the Fraud
Schemes Using IRS Investigation Summaries. Journal of Forensic & Investigative
Accounting, 10(1), 38-55.
Objectives Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2017 (Rep.). (2016, June 30). Retrieved May 6, 2019,
from NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017JRC/Volume_1.pdf
Objectives Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2018 (Rep.). (2017, June 28). Retrieved May 2, 2019,
from NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018JRC/JRC18_Volume1.pdf
Objectives Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2019 (Rep.). (2018, July 27). Retrieved May 6, 2019,
from NTA website: https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2019JRC/JRC19_Volume1_AOF_04.pdf
U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance. (2007, April 12). Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of
Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure (M. R. Phillips, Author) [S. Rept.]. Retrieved April 30,
2019, from https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/congress_04122007.htm
Results of the 2015 Filing Season (Rep.). (2015, August 31). Retrieved May 2, 2019, from
TIGTA website: https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201540080fr.pdf

34

The IRS Has Failed to Provide Effective and Timely Assistance to Victims of Identity
Theft (Rep.). (2012). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from NTA website:
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Most-SeriousProblems-Identity-Theft.pdf
The Taxpayer Protection Program Includes Processes and Procedures That Are Generally
Effective in Reducing Taxpayer Burden (Rep.). (2018, October 17). Retrieved May 1, 2019,
from TIGTA website:
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2019reports/201940004fr.pdf
There Are Billions of Dollars in Undetected Tax Refund Fraud Resulting From Identity
Theft (Rep. No. 2012-42-080). (2012). Retrieved April 25, 2019, from
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201242080fr.html
Thorne, B. M., & Stryker, J. P. (2014). The “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams Plus 1. Academy of
Business Disciplines Journal, 1-22.
Weisman, S. (2017, March 28). Beware of evolving income tax scams. Retrieved April 24, 2019,
from https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/2017/03/28/beware-evolvingincome-tax-scams/99408936/
White, J. R. (2011, June 2). Status of IRS Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers (Rep. No. 11721T). Retrieved April 30, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126344.pdf
White, J. R. (2012, November 29). Total Extent of Refund Fraud Using Stolen Identities is
Unknown (Rep.). Retrieved May 1, 2019, from GAO website:
https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650365.pdf

35

